International trade economists typically assume that there are no cross-country differences in industry total factor productivity (TFP). In contrast, this paper finds large and persistent TFP differences across a group of industrialized countries in the 1980s. The paper calculates TFP indices, and statistically examines the sources of the observed large TFP differences across countries. Two hypotheses are examined to account for TFP differences: constant returns to scale production with country-specific technological differences, and industry-level scale economies with identical technology in each country. The data support the constant returns/different technology hypothesis over the increasing returns/same technology hypothesis.
Introduction
Two fundamental assumptions in neoclassical trade theory are that technological knowledge is the same in all countries, and that production processes exhibit constant returns to scale. An equivalent way of stating this assumption is that total factor productivity (TFP) for each industry is the same in every country: a given level of inputs will produce the same amount of output in each country. If this is the case, then production sets differ across countries only because of differences in factor endowments. Recent work by Harrigan (1995) , however, shows that there are systematic differences across countries in industry outputs that can not be explained by differences in factor endowments. While there are many possible explanations for this result, one such explanation is that technology is not the same across countries. This is a hypothesis which has gained greater attention from international economists recently, including Trefler (1993 Trefler ( , 1995 , Dollar and Wolff (1993) and Harrigan (1997a) . If technology is not the same across countries, then much of the theoretical work in neoclassical trade theory is irrelevant to applied research on cross-country comparisons, and much of the applied research that assumes identical technology (for example, many applied general equilibrium models and factor endowment regressions) is misspecified.
One important possibility, however, is that TFP differences are the result of a mismatch between the theory of TFP comparisons and the technological and measurement processes which generate the data. For example, if there are increasing returns to scale at the level of national industries, then countries with larger industry outputs will have higher measured TFP even if technology is identical. If there is imperfect competition in output or input markets, then labor's share of total factor payments need not correspond to labor's share of total costs. If there is substantial measurement error in inputs and/or outputs, then TFP may also appear to be substantially different even if the underlying technology is the same. This paper investigates the possibility that returns to scale and/or imperfect competition effects bias TFP comparisons.
In this paper, I estimate cross-country technology differences using two approaches. I compute TFP indexes using a panel of data on value added, capital stocks, and employment for eleven OECD countries during the 1980's. This data set combines newly available data from the OECD and the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Using the same data, I directly estimate crosscountry differences in industry production functions. The econometric results are used to draw inferences about technological differences which are compared to the direct calculations of TFP .
There are two general types of studies that have calculated international TFP differentials: studies of value added and studies of gross output. Within this breakdown, there are studies which vary in their level of disaggregation and their country coverage. There are a number of studies of growth in TFP which are not reviewed here, since they are not directly relevant to the question of the level of TFP across countries . 1 Among the studies which calculate TFP using a value added output measure are Dollar and Wolff (1993) , Dollar, Wolff and Baumol (1988) , Maskus (1991) , , and van Ark and Pilat (1993) . The first three of these use overall GDP price levels to deflate sectoral outputs. This introduces a distortion to the extent that relative prices differ across countries, and Harrigan (1997b) shows that this distortion is large enough to substantively change the results of TFP comparisons. The two closely related studies by and van Ark and Pilat (1993) deflate value added by a price index which is constructed by direct comparisons of output prices at the wholesale level rather than using GDP price levels. Unfortunately, this theoretically superior procedure is compromised by the very small number of matches across countries for particular products (see the discussion by Jorgenson following van Ark and Pilat 1993) . In addition, the van and van Ark and Pilat (1993) studies include only a small number of countries and years.
The second class of studies of TFP uses data on gross output, and deflates all inputs (capital, labor, materials, energy, etc) in a symmetric way. This procedure was pioneered by
Jorgenson and various coauthors, and is undoubtedly the most theoretically appealing and least restrictive method of making productivity comparisons (see Jorgenson (1990) for a comprehensive introduction to the methodology). Because of the very stringent data requirements needed for the Jorgenson procedure, however, there have been only two studies applying this method and they have compared only two countries, the United States and Japan.
The current paper extends the literature in three ways. First, to avoid assuming that relative prices do not vary across countries I construct estimates of sector-specific price levels.
Second, I use data on a broad sample of OECD countries over ten years. Lastly, I use both index number theory and cross-country econometric analysis to characterize the extent of TFP differences . 
Data
The data and measurement issues involved in making international comparisons of industries are discussed extensively in a companion paper to this one (Harrigan (1997b) ). In this section I describe some of the methods and conclusions of that paper.
Real Output
Cross-country comparisons require data on outputs, inputs and prices. The OECD has recently compiled data on nominal output, valued added, employment, and gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) from a number of existing data sources to form a single internally consistent source for disaggregated cross-country comparisons . 3 Making the OECD data internationally comparable requires currency conversion, and this is the most problematic part of any international comparison. Using purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP deflators is the most common procedure, but this biases industry level comparisons since it implicitly assumes that there are no relative price differences across countries. Some of the problems of using GDP PPPs can be mitigated by using the component deflators reported in the OECD documentation of the construction of the overall GDP PPPs (Ward 1985 , OECD 1987 , and OECD 1992b . This paper constructs price levels for machinery and equipment using this disaggregated data . Expressed as a percentage of the overall GDP deflator price levels, the 4 constructed price levels vary widely across countries: the standard deviation across countries is on the order of 20 percentage points, with a range of around 65 percentage points (see Table 1 in Harrigan (1997b) ). If a country's price level is high, it is because a standardized unit of output is more expensive in that country than in the US; it does not mean that output in that country is of higher quality, since the price index ostensibly compares like goods in the countries being compared. The standardized unit of output being compared is meant to be representative of the OECD as a whole, so the choice of the dollar as a standard for purposes of cross country comparisons is inconsequential.
The above procedure converts nominal domestic currency magnitudes into units of nominal US dollars sufficient to purchase a standardized basket of goods. To make these dollar magnitudes comparable over time, value added is deflated using industry price indexes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Capital
The OECD data reports industry investment flows in current own-currency values. I convert industry investment into U.S. dollars using the overall investment price levels from Summers and Heston (1991), and the flows are then converted into constant dollars using the implicit deflator for US fixed non-residential investment from the National Income and Product Accounts, various years.
Given the series on real investment, the capital stock is a function of past investment flows. The choice of function is both important and somewhat arbitrary, since it is not feasible to gather information on useful asset lives and depreciation patterns across industries and countries. I (rather uncomfortably) follow many previous researchers and construct the capital stock as a distributed lag of past investment flows:
where k is the capital stock of industry j in country c at the beginning of year t, * < 1 is the cjt discount factor, and i is real investment during year t. Note that the capital stock in year t does not include year t investment, but only up through year t-1. In this paper, because I only have investment going back to 1970, I use * = 0.15 and T = 10. If the actual useful life of a capital
good is 20 years, this amounts to dropping about 10% of the total weight used in constructing the "true" capital stock.
An alternative method is to use the so-called delayed linear scrapping rule: a newly purchased capital good is added to the capital stock, and after a period of S years a constant proportion 1/(M+1) is scrapped each year:
This is a formula used by many national statistical agencies, as well as by the OECD in it's Intersectoral Database for international comparisons (OECD, 1996) . With S=3 and M= 7, the resulting capital stock estimates are extremely highly correlated with the capital stocks constructed using equation (1): the minimum within-industry correlation is 0.9992. Of course, there are other plausible parameter choices which would yield different capital stock estimates, but given the short sample available, all would be highly correlated since they would all give high weight to recent investments, quickly declining weight to investments more than a few years old,
value added function is translog with identical second-order terms, so that the value added function of country c can be written as where constant returns to scale requires " + " = 1 and 2" + " = 2" + " = 0. Under the 1c 2c 3 5 4 5 additional assumptions that producers are cost-minimizers and price takers in input markets, Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982) show that the geometric mean of the two distance A major difficulty in implementing a TFP comparison is volatility in the labor shares s , j which is suggestive of measurement error. Under the assumptions about technology and input market behavior used to derive (3), labor's share in total cost is equal to the elasticity of output with respect to labor, so that The cost shares in the raw data are very volatile, and in many cases exceed one. In the results reported below, I use a smoothing procedure based on equation (5) to generate the cost shares used in constructing the TFP index. For each industry, I estimate the following regression by OLS over all time periods t and countries c: For shipbuilding and repairing, the sample mean for labor's share exceeds one, so I use the sample mean for labor's share in all machinery. Of course, this suggests that the TFP index for shipbuilding should be regarded with great skepticism. To the extent that these data problems come from random mis-measurement of outputs, they will not bias the econometric results reported below. To the extent that there is non-random measurement error (e.g. correlated across observations) or there is measurement error in inputs, the econometric results will be biased. Table 2 offers a summary of the TFP results reported in Table 1 . For each industry, the log of TFP is regressed on country fixed effects and a time trend. The US is the excluded fixed effect, so the exponential of the country fixed effects are average TFP relative to the US during the sample period, after detrending. The elements of Table 2 are these exponentiated estimated fixed effects. For each industry, proportionate differences outside the approximate interval (0.95,1.05) are statistically significantly different from 1.0 at the 5% confidence level; the only exception is the "other transport equipment" industry, where because of the small sample size none of the proportions is significantly different from 1.0 Table 2 makes it clear that the US was either the leader or co-leader in TFP during the 1980's in six of the eight industries. The US trailed badly only in electrical machinery, and was tied for second with Japan in shipbuilding. In motor vehicles, the US and Japan had a TFP lead of
12 (6) 20-25% over a group of countries including Canada, Germany, and Italy. The US was the clear leader in office and computing equipment and (surprisingly?) in radio, TV, and communications equipment. Table 3 summarizes cross-industry TFP using a version of the multilateral TFP index of equation (3). The index number formula used in Table 3 weights sectoral outputs relative to the mean using revenue shares, and expresses this quantity relative to an index of total capital and labor used in all sectors, where inputs are weighted using cost shares. The formula for comparing (6) is easiest to understand in the Cobb-Douglas case, when the revenue and cost shares are the same across observations, in which case (6) reduces to
The index (6) used in Table 3 has all the same desirable properties as the industry-byindustry index (3) used in Table 1 : it is superlative and transitive.
One practical problem with applying (6) is that it is undefined if there are missing observations for a particular industry. Since there are many holes in the data, this makes it impossible to compare many observations. In constructing Table 3 , I apply (6) using data on all industries except Aircraft and Other Transport Equipment. Excluding these two industries allows calculation of cross-industry TFP for eight countries on the remaining six industries. Excluding aircraft will lower US relative TFP in machinery and equipment, since the US has a large aircraft industry which has a substantial TFP advantage over other countries.
The information in Table 3 is presented in two ways. In Panel A, each observation is expressed relative to the US in 1987; Panel B presents year by year comparisons relative to the US. Figures 1 and 3 illustrate the data in Panels A and B respectively. In the late 1980s, the United States and Japan were the co-leaders in TFP among the large countries . A group of four 12 countries (Germany, Italy, Canada and Norway) were 10-20% points behind the US and Japan.
Britain, at 60-70% of US TFP, is the clear laggard among the eight countries in the table. A surprise is that Finland is roughly equal to the US and Japan in TFP. A clue to this is apparent from Table 3 shows that of the seven countries with at least nine years of data, only Canada and Japan did not see substantial TFP growth from the early to the late 1980s;
United States TFP grew by over 20%. A comparison of Tables 1, 2 , and 3 is instructive: the overall numbers in Table 3 mask considerable sectoral TFP differences in Table 2 , while the decade-average TFP differences in Table 2 obscure the substantial year to year variations in TFP that are apparent in Tables 1 and 3 .
As noted above, one difficulty in interpreting the TFP numbers is that TFP is procyclical.
A simple way to adjust for this is to scale sectoral output by a measure of the GDP gap. Table 4 reports TFP where actual output has been replaced by output multiplied by the ratio of potential to actual GDP; in recession years this amounts to attributing greater potential output to a sector than the amount actually produced. Potential GDP is estimated as the log-linear 20 year trend of actual GDP . Figures 2 and 4 illustrate the two panels of Table 4 . The pattern of relative TFP is All four tables suggest that the three largest economies (US, Japan, and Germany)
generally have the best TFP performance. This is consistent with industry-level economies of scale being an important determinant of TFP . Industry-level scale economies are not the sort of scale 14 economies often considered in recent trade models, such as the monopolistic competition trade model summarized by Helpman and Krugman (1985, Chapter 5-7) , where industry production functions have constant returns to scale even though individual firm production functions exhibit increasing returns . However, in models such as Ethier (1982) 
Econometric Estimation of Technology Differences
This section describes a methodology for calculating cross-country productivity differences by econometric estimation of industry value added production functions. The purpose of the statistical model is to calculate measures of technological difference which explicitly allow for random variation in output, and to allow exploration of some hypotheses about the technology differences. The regression methodology also relies less heavily on economic theory than do index number comparisons of TFP. This is important since, as documented in Harrigan (1997b) , there is reason to believe that some of the assumptions which are necessary to construct TFP index numbers are violated in this data set. The cost of econometric analysis is that parameter estimation requires imposing a statistical model on the data, so the econometric results should be regarded as complements to rather than substitutes for the TFP index number calculations.
For a particular industry in country c in year t , write real value added y as a function of ct the real capital stock k and the level of employment l :
ct ct ct ct Hicks-neutral technical differences over time and across countries imply that this function can be written as where ( = " + " -1. Equation (10) states that value added per worker depends on capital per 1 2 worker and total employment. It is straightforward to show that the elasticity of scale of (10) is equal to 1 + (, so that ( is a convenient measure of the extent to which the industry production function differs from constant returns to scale.
The results reported in Table 1 This model involves estimating industry specific intercept and slope terms (the "'s and (), and in addition supposing that each country's cross-industry average TFP is given by $ + $ @t. An 0c 1c
alternative way of modeling TFP differences is to suppose that there are industry specific time trends which are common across countries and that TFP differences are common for a particular country across industries. In this case, the statistical model is
cjt cjt 0c 1j j 1j cjt cjt j cjt cjt Equation (11) is consistent with models of TFP growth with convergence in cross-industry TFP.
TFP convergence (or divergence) is measured by differences in the cross-industry growth rate parameters $ across countries. Because of the short length of the panel in this paper and the 1c short-term fluctuations in TFP that are evident in Table 1 , it is very difficult to accurately estimate these country growth rate parameters, so I do not address convergence in this paper . Equation
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(12) treats country TFP differences as constant over time, but allows for differential TFP growth rates across sectors. Equation (12) is consistent with TFP convergence or divergence at the level of total manufacturing to the extent that countries change their relative output mix over time.
Because of the short-run fixity of capital and because of labor hoarding, firms do not vary inputs in the short run proportionately with outputs, leading to strong cyclical movement in capacity utilization and measured TFP. A simple way to model this cyclicality is to suppose that capacity output is given by the production function, while actual output exceeds or falls short of capacity by an amount depending on the GDP gap, µ = (actual GDP)/(potential GDP):
ct ct ct ct ct
*
The parameter * is the elasticity of capacity utilization with respect to the stage of the business cycle, and the specification has the feature that capacity utilization is 100% when µ = 1. If * > 1, then industry capacity utilization is more cyclical than the economy, while * < 1 is the opposite case. Preliminary data mining in cross-country regressions over time indicates that the null hypothesis of * = 1 can never be rejected at traditional significance levels for any industry, so I impose this simplifying restriction in what follows. This leads to the equation to be estimated: depending in a simple way on the partition into industries and countries: (14) is weighted regression with weights given by 1/F . ^c j A potentially very serious econometric problem in estimating (14) is correlation between the right hand side variables and the error term. This could occur for two reasons. The first is measurement error in capital and labor. The second is a simultaneity problem: if industry employment of factors increases due to a productivity shock to the production function, then employment will be positively correlated with the error term. I have attempted to mitigate this simultaneity problem by controlling for the stage of the business cycle which is itself correlated with TFP. The appropriate solution to both the measurement error and simultaneity problems is to use an instrumental variables estimator, but I have not been able to find appropriate instruments.
Therefore, the estimated parameters of (14) will not be consistent estimates of the structural parameters, so they should be interpreted with caution.
The Cobb-Douglas specification for value added is restrictive. In preliminary work, I estimated a translog specification, which differs from the specification in (14) by the inclusion of a quadratic term in the log of the capital-labor ratio, " (ln k l ). The translog is a flexible 3j cjt cjt functional form, which is also a second order approximation to the constant-elasticity-ofsubstitution (CES) production function (see Kmenta, 1986, pg. 515) . In this preliminary work, the correlation between the estimates " and " was virtually -1 for each industry j. A way of1 j 3j expressing this result is that the data can accurately estimate " + " , but that it is very 1j 3j
uninformative about " -" . As a consequence of the data's inability to separately identify " , all 1j 3j 3j the results which follow set " /0 and are variants of the Cobb-Douglas specification. i). The unrestricted model allows for two sources of industry productivity differences: differences in the scale of production within an industry and country-specific differences in productivity which are common across industries. The imposition of constant returns to scale in Model 2 means that any cross-country differences in productivity will be attributed to country-specific differences in productivity which are common across industries. Briefly, this is the "constant returns with different technology" hypothesis for explaining cross-country differences in industry productivity.
Results

Table 5 reports estimates of three variants of equation (14) . The estimator in each case
In Model 3, by contrast, the exclusion of country effects means that any cross-country differences in industry productivity will be attributed to non-constant returns to scale, which can be labeled the "non-constant returns with identical technology" hypothesis. To aid interpretation, the country fixed effects reported are the exponential of the estimated coefficients; since the US is the excluded category, the exponentiated coefficients measure the proportionate TFP differential in machinery between a country and the US.
In model 1, the estimated coefficients on log capital per worker are reasonable except for an estimate of -0.63 for electrical machinery. A surprise from model 1 is that in no industry is there evidence of increasing returns to scale, and in five of the eight industries there are large and statistically significant estimated decreasing returns. In model 3, which excludes country fixed effects, this result is reversed: there are diseconomies of scale only in the electrical machinery sector, while there are large and statistically significant increasing returns in five of the eight industries.
This pattern of results may be partially explained by the fact that most of the variation in industry size is across countries. This suggests that larger countries may have disproportionately large industries due to moderate economies of scale, but that unrestricted estimation with this small data set can not sharply distinguish between country fixed effects and scale economies. This interpretation is strengthened by noting the change in the pattern of country fixed effects between models 1 and 2: when constant returns are imposed, the country fixed effects increase substantially relative to the US, the largest country in the sample. This negative correlation between estimated country effects and estimated scale economies was also noted by Maskus (1991). Table 6 reports two types of test statistics which can shed further light on these issues.
The first part of the table reports standard F-tests of the linear restrictions embodied in models 2 and 3; these restrictions are rejected at any conventional significance level. The second part of the where p is the number of restrictions embodied in Model 3. The posterior odds ratios indicate 3 that the data support the unrestricted model over either restricted model, but that Model 2 fits the data substantially better than Model 3. Note also that only in Model 2 do all the estimated coefficients on the capital/labor ratio satisfy the theoretical restriction that they lie between zero and one. With a proper prior that embodied this theoretical restriction, the posterior odds ratios would be more favorable to Model 2 than is reported in Table 6 .
The country fixed effects estimated in Models 1 and 2, which are estimates of overall TFP in machinery relative to the US level, are mainly reasonable in magnitude and thought-provoking.
In Model 1, the US is the statistically significant TFP leader of every country through the 1980's.
The laggard is Norway, with TFP of just 34% of the US level. Japanese TFP ranks second at about 82% of the US level, while Germany is third at 75% of the US level. In model 2, which imposes constant returns to scale, Japanese TFP is closer to the US level, at 93%, which is not statistically significantly different from 100%. German and Canadian TFP in Model 2 are about 90% of the US level, which is barely a statistically significant difference. The Australian results are not believable and can probably be attributed to the data anomaly noted above. Among the EC countries in the sample, Italy trails Germany and leads Britain and the Netherlands, each of which substantially trails the US. Finland, Norway and Sweden have TFP comparable to Britain and the Netherlands.
The industry TFP growth rates estimated in Model 1 range from a low of -1.7% per year for shipbuilding to a high of 12% per year for electrical machinery. Given the anomalous estimate for the effect of capital per worker on output in machinery, this large TFP growth rate is suspicious and should probably be discounted. Excluding electrical machinery, the fastest growth in TFP occurred in radio, TV, and communications equipment at 7.2% per year. Office and computing equipment and non-electrical machinery also had rapid TFP growth. This pattern of results does not differ much across the three specifications.
It is instructive to compare the results reported in Table 5 with the TFP index number comparisons reported in Tables 1, 2 Tables 3 and 5 : the regression procedure reported in Table 5 does not weigh the good TFP performance of Finland's electrical machinery sector as heavily as the index number procedure of Table 3 .
Another way to compare the Table 5 and TFP results is to compare the coefficient on the capital-labor ratio in Model 2 (where constant returns are imposed) with capital's share of total cost. If there is perfect competition in both input and output markets, the two numbers should be approximately the same. As Table 7 shows, the differences are small but statistically significant in most cases . The regression results weight capital more heavily than capital's share in total cost, 21 which is consistent with imperfect competition in input markets which cause the elasticities of outputs to differ from the factor cost shares.
Conclusion
This paper has constructed and analyzed a data set on real industry inputs and outputs for a group of industrialized countries during the 1980s. The results of the paper confirm the view that there are large and persistent differences in TFP across the industrialized countries. This inference was suggested by the TFP comparisons of Table 1 , and is supported by the econometric data analysis of the previous section.
The econometric results suggest that industry-level economies of scale are probably not large, and almost certainly can not account for the large size of cross-country TFP differences.
This suggests several alternative hypotheses. The first is that there are technological differences across the developed countries, a view which conflicts with the traditional presumption of international trade economists that production sets are the same everywhere. This hypothesis is supported by the data analysis here, in the sense that the hypothesis fits the data better than the increasing returns hypothesis, and also produces the most plausible parameter values of the three statistical models that are estimated. A variant on this hypothesis which does not require supposing differential access to technical knowledge is that there are differences in the legal, social, and political environments across countries which have major effects on TFP.
Unfortunately, this is a hard hypothesis to investigate empirically.
A third alternative is that there is systematic measurement error in the components of the TFP index. If this view is correct, better measurement will narrow observed TFP differences.
While this can not be ruled out, it should be noted that this paper has used disaggregated price and labor data and the resulting estimated TFP differences, while often somewhat different from previous studies, are not smaller. Figure 1 , and Panel B is graphed in Figure 3 .
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Notes to Table 4: This table differs from Table 3 by multiplying each country's output by the ratio of trend to actual GDP. This is a way of smoothing out TFP variability which is caused by business cycle variation in capacity utilization. See also the notes to Table 3 . Panel A of this table is graphed in Figure 2 , and Panel B is graphed in Figure 4 . Table 4 . Notes to Table 7 : Column (1) is the coefficient on the capital-labor ratio in Model 2, reproduced from Table 5 . Column (2) is the average of capital's weight in the TFP calculations of Table 1 .
Column (3) is the marginal significance level of the difference between columns (1) and (2).
factor exponents", which is simply false, and they claim that in, for example, US-Japan comparisons "the rank comparison may depend on whether one uses the Japanese or the U.S.
factor share", which is unintelligible since the CCD index uses an average of the country's factor shares rather than one or the other. This criticism does apply to their own TTP index, which they acknowledge. In addition, the TTP index is based on a restricted form of the translog with second order terms set identically equal to zero, so their rejection of the translog's implications for timeseries variation in factor shares applies a fortiori to their own index.
10. Harrigan (1997b) reports a more complete version of Table 1 ; some results are omitted here in the interests of brevity.
11. These cyclical effects are why the numbers are presented relative to the US level in 1987; year by year comparisons to the US are uninformative because they are dominated by differences across countries in the stage of the business cycle.
12. In Jorgenson, Kuroda and Nishimizu (1987) , the authors do not report the levels of relative TFP, but they do report that Japan trailed the US in machinery and equipment in 1979, although they expected Japan to close the gap with the US in the near future (pg. 26). Jorgenson and Kuroda (1990) updates the earlier study, and reports that by the mid-1980's Japan had industry TFP that was equal to or greater than US TFP in many machinery sectors. Their results are quite consistent with the results reported here, which provides some grounds for hoping that the results of value added and gross output TFP comparisons might generally be comparable.
13. The capacity utilization measure µ has a mean of one by construction, and a sample standard deviation of 2.5%. The standard deviation by country varies from a low of 1.3% (Japan) to a high of 4.6% (Norway). A more sophisticated treatment of capacity utilization would define capacity as the minimum of the short run average cost curve, but the data required for such an adjustment is not available. See Morrison (1993) , Chapter 3.
14. Note that the calculation of the TFP index (3) requires either an assumption of constant returns to scale or a priori knowledge of the degree of scale economies (see Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982) , pg. 1394).
15. In the Helpman-Krugman model, the scale of production of an individual firm depends on the elasticity of demand. In the tractable case of CES preferences and large numbers of firms, this elasticity is a constant, and changes in industry output are accommodated by changes in the number of firms rather than changes in the scale of existing firms. With more complex preferences which allow for changes in the elasticity of demand with changes in the number of varieties, there may be industry level economies of scale (see Brown (1991) and Lancaster (1984) Dollar and Wolff (1993) and Jones (1996a and 1996b) . These authors use overall GDP price levels to deflate sectoral outputs, so their results should be interpreted with caution for the reasons mentioned in the Introduction.
18. The null hypothesis of groupwise homoskedasticity is F = F . A Lagrange Multiplier test of
